This project produced empirical research on the use of contractual mechanisms in commissioning. It investigated how commissioners negotiate, specify, monitor and manage contractual mechanisms. It aimed to understand which practices produce the best services in their local health economy. The project looked at both acute services and community healthcare.
The project explored the different formal provisions in contracts – including the imposition of penalties and incentives – for promoting quality of care across the NHS in England. It looked at how, in practice, contractual penalties and incentives are negotiated, specified and enforced.
The project seeked to identify the effects of the use (or non-use) of such contractual mechanisms on the delivery of health services.
This three year project aimed to investigate how commissioners negotiated, specified, monitored and managed contractual mechanisms to improve services and allocate financial risk in their local health economies, looking at both acute services and community health care.
The interim report presents findings from a research into how
commissioners negotiate, specify, monitor and manage contractual
mechanisms to improve services and allocate financial risk in their
local health economies, looking at both acute services and community
health care.